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INFORMATION REPORT

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General Operations

1. About 80 percent of the operational lines of communication which had been established by agents of the North Korean State Security Bureau (SSB) before the wer were disrupted by the end of 1951. Agents were being infiltrated successfully through the lines disguised as refugees, but subsequent communication with them was unsatisfactory, since it was impossible to set up any definite liaison methods because of the shifting combat zone. In September 1950, in Seoul, SSB operations were seriously affected when a majority of the agents who had been left in or sent into the Seoul area surrendered themselves to ICE investigative agencies to protect themselves and assure at least their temporary security. The SSB estimated that about 1,500 agents

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gave themselves up in the Seoul area alone. These egents now are legally (sic) residents of the ROK, but it will be semetime before they can secure the confidence of the ROK authorities and begin to reorganize their operations.

 The SSB left about 3,000 stay-behind agents in Pyongyang in October 1950, and the SSE and other intelligence agencies sent into the area another 17,000 agents and informants. These agents were given first-class treatment by the SSB only if they had first shown their allegiance to the North Korean regime by harming rightist elements in their home town or village. This was a typically cruel measure of the North Korean government, but it gave positive proof of the ideology of the agent and at the same time it made sure he could not defect and surrender to the United Nations forces. Some of these 20,000 agents left Pyongyang with other refugees for the ROK, and in 1951 were scattered in various areas of South Korea. However, seldom were activities of these agents reported to the MSS, and it was not possible to establish liaison routes for them. Operations as a whole were unsatisfactory. In late 1951 intelligence was being collected primarily from prisoner of war interrogations and from the interrogation of captured United Nations intelligence agents. The SSB had captured about 200 such agents by the end of June 1951. Little information was secured from captured combat soldiers.

MSS School and Detachment in the Yonback Area

- 3. A training school of the Ministry of Social Security in which about 150 men and 60 women are students was at Mugu-ri (126-15, 37-57) (BF 5803) on 17 January 1952. There were 32 instructors at the school, including five women, all of whom had completed an eight-month course at the Pyongyang training center of the Ministry of Social Security. The school for agents at Mugu-ri began classes I October 1951. The course can be completed in three months but usually a preliminary period of training of an additional three months is required. The first class was scheduled to be graduated 1 April 1952.
- 4. Students at the school were recruited by the Kaesong branch² of the Ministry of Social Security, which field office is responsible for agent activity in the Secul area. All students have relatives in Secul or the vicinity. The following were some of the students at the school in January 1952:

CHANG Hak-su (), aged 20, from Seoul.
CHO Chiol-un (), aged 17, from Seoul.
KANG Pyong-kwon (), aged 23, from Kaesong. KANG attended school in Seoul Defore the war.
KIM Sch-il (), aged 18, from Seoul.
HUN Yang-sik (), aged 18, from Seoul.
YANG Sun-sil (), aged 19, a girl, from Seoul.

- 5. The leading members of the teaching staff are the following:
 - a. WON Yong-su () aged 38, chief instructor, a native of North Challa Province in the ROK. WON was arrested and imprisoned by ROK authorities until the North Korsen invasion. He is a graduate of the Pyongyang intelligence school. Aliases which WON has used include KIM Tong-hyok () and HYON Chun (). In the school he is known as HYON Tong-mu or "Conrade HYON."
 - b. YI Ch ol-un (失數集), former SSB agent and known in the school as "Comrade YI."

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- KIW Heli-cil (A Mark), a woman aged 27, of North Cholla Province.

 KIW is the sister-in-law of KE. Sam-yong, South Korean Communist
 leader executed by the ROK authorities during the first few days of
 the war. She is in charge of the administration of the school.
- d. YI Ch'ang-yon (美麗斯), political commissar at the school, a graduate of both the Sedong Political School and the Pyongyang intelligence school.
- 6. In late January 1952 the Yonbesk-gun office of the MSS was headed by KIM Tok-sam (), aged 32, who was assisted by YI Won-hi (), aged 37, deputy chief, and HC Tae-chun () // // // //), aged 31, chief of personnel. PAK Tu-op () was the political commisser. The organization of the Yonback-gun unit and some of the other officials were as follows:
 - a. Interrogation Section.
 Chief: KIM Kuk-chin (金属), aged 34.
 Interrogators: CHONG Se-chin (京文 京), YI Chae-son (今年程),
 KEM Yong-sik (全国)。and KEM Ku-yon (全国))。
 - b. Investigation Section.
 Chief: KIM Ch'on-su (女 天), aged 29.
 Investigators: KIM Nam-yong (五), KI Po-kwon (五 子 村),
 YI Han-sik (東 方 村), PAM Ch'ang-ik (村 方), and CHO Ch'un-sok

 - d. Administration Section. Chief: KIN Nun-sik (A: 人村). Glerk: HAN Seng-hyop (東南朝).
 - s. Files and Registered Documents Section: KIM Hybk-man (在新菜)。 HNANG Sun-se (青順文), and KIM Han-su (全富美), a woman.
- 7. When students in the MSS training school at lingu-ri have completed their training there, they will be given a one-week course of instruction by the Yonback-gun MSS office. The students will be briefed on the current military situation and the military codes and passwords used in the ROK army. Officers of the Espionage Section will instruct the students on methods of acquiring jobs as houseless and mechanics with American units.

Name's onjon Detachment

8. In September 1951 the office of the Nameh onjon (126-24, 38-20) (BT 7346) detachment of the MSS was in five cave shelters at the foot of a mountain in the county. The Nameh office prosecutor's office was in the same shelter so that the activities of the two offices could be coordinated easily, and cells for prisoners were also in the shelter. The MSS detschment was in charge of Major PAK (fun), agod 30, a member of the NKLF and a native of Pydagyang.

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-11-

- A Captain KIM (fmm) headed the Inspection Section of the unit, and other members of the staff included four senior captains, seven captains, four senior lieutenants, and two lieutenants. They dressed in either civilian clothes or army uniforms, changing frequently. They were armed with pistols.
- The detachment in Namen fonjon had placed three or four informants in each village of the county. Suspects were being arrested whether or not there was substantial evidence against them, and in September there were about 250 persons under arrest. The detachment selected those considered innocent and sent them to the ROK on espionage missions, keeping them separate from the other nets. 3 Arrestees generally accepted the missions, fearing that if they did not they would be branded disloyal citizens. After 20 or 30 days of training, those agents were dispatched to the ROK to infiltrate labor groups. North Korean army troops ascorted them to the front lines, the principal route employed being that through Kaesong. One suspect, after being interrogated at length and charged with confiding to neighbors that it would be better to flee south than endure taxetion and lack of food, was ceaten until he fell senseless. After two weeks he was again interrogated and tortured into unconsciousness by the use of electric shock. The third interrogation was conducted by a captain who said the suspect would be pargoned because he had two sons fighting with the North Korean army, and asked the suspect to go to the ROK as a spy for the government as a patrictic act; he would be rewarded, the captain said, according to what he produced. The pardoned prisoner protested because of his weakened physical condition. After examining him, the captain agreed that he was too ill and told him to return to his village and report on reactionsxies there.

Chinnamp'o Detachmen

- The Chinnamp's (125-24, 38-44) (YC 0989) detachment of the MES in late October 1951 was operating from the former criminal courts building in the Yongjong-ni (area of the city. Chief of the detachment was Major XIM Tas-ho (), aged 39, a native of Chinnamp's. He was assisted by Sonior Captain MIN Yong-pal (), aged 39, of Tami-myon, Yonggang-gun, in South Pyongan Province. Chief of the intelligence section was Captain MAN Kil-chun (), aged 30, of Kilchn-gun, North Hangyong Province: and in charge of administration was Senior Licutenant PAK In-gun (), aged 24, of Chinnamp's. All are members of the NKIP. There were about 39 persons on the staff of the detachment, which employed in addition about 500 informants in the area. The regular employees were assigned to observe and investigate the ideology of employees in various North Korean agencies and associations, and handle the informants. The informants worked under cover as ordinary employees and citizens to collect information in the area, but in the future some will be used in intelligence operations in the ROK.

 Since the Chinnamp's area covers the approaches to Pyongyang from the Yellow Sea, informant mets, complicated in organization, were established to check on travellers and merchants, some informants being disguised as peddlers and smagglers. Suspicious persons were being sent to the MES office for interrogation by these informants.
- 11. An unusual activity of the Chimnemp's detachment was its direct control of the Chosun Trading Company (Chosun Sangsa)5 office in the area. Ten sailing vessels and two motor boats, the latter having a speed of from eight to 10 knots, which were in the harbor at Chimnemp's and were outwardly under Chosun Trading Company management, were actually used by the MSS in the city. Their movements were directly controlled by the MSS, and although ostensibly they were used to patrol the harbor and prevent the entry of ROK intelligence agents, their main purpose was to infiltrate MSS agents into the ROK by moving them down the west coast by sea.

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Monsen Area Detachments and Agent Training

- 12. The Wonsan City detachment of the Ministry of Social Security in Jamuary 1952 was in the village hall at Yongsan-dong, Monsan (127-26, 39-10) (CU 5536). Colonel CHU Song-ku ()) was chief of the detachment; Senior Captain CHO Krong-hva () deputy chief; Captain T'AK Un-hwen () () chief of the Education Section; and Captain PAK Ch'él () chief of the Intelligence Section.
- 13. In January the Wonsan detachment was primarily interested in recruiting agents from the area for infiltration into the ROK. Thirty persons were recruited and undergoing a 20-day training period in January. Selection of the recruits was generally from persons who had collaborated with ROK youth organizations or United Nations security authorities during the occupation of the area by United Nations forces, and who had completely repented and have since faithfully cooperated with North Korean authorities. Training consisted of instruction in Communist party history and propaganda directed toward the ordinary labor elements of the population; periods of military training and drill; reporting of order of battle information; briefing on the investigation of the ROK government's treatment of refugees and their living conditions; and special directives for agents who planned to penetrate specific United Nations organizations.
- In October 1951 the First Bureau of the Mangwon Province Detachmento of the East Coast Department of the Ministry of Social Security was commanded by Colonel CHU Song-ku, aged 4), a native of Kyonggi Province. His deputy was Captain CHO Kyong-hwa, aged 40; the chief instructor was Captain Tak Un-hwan, aged 30; and the intelligence officer PAK Ch'ol, aged 31. All were members of the South Korean Labor Party and natives of Kyonggi Province except CHO, who was a native of South Hamgyong Province and a member of the North Korean labor Party. The 17th Unit of the First Bureau in October was dispatching agents into the islands of Yonghung-man (127-24, 39-15) (C' 6845) after twenty days of training. The agents, one of whom was KIM Chong-sun, a girl aged 21, were being trained at various houses in the Pongchung area. One was the home of YU Kyong-chan, aged 27. The primary mission of these agents was to determine the organization, personnel, and procedures of United Nations intelligence organizations on Yo-do (127-38, 39-14) (CU 8243), including the means of communication with headquarters, the frequencies and call signs used, and whether they communicated directly to headquarters or via another island. The 17th Unit was also interested in descriptions and names of United Nations agents, locations of safehouses, treatment received by agents, the periods for which they were dispatched, and the means used to infiltrate North Korean agencies. The agents the 17th Unit trained were to secure information on United Nations strength on the island and, incidentally, relationship with the people.
- 15. Another detachment of the MSS in the Monsan area was at Nanch on (127-17, 39-17) (GU 5249) in October 1951. Chief of the detachment was SO To-chong, aged 30, SKIP member and a native of Kyonggi Province. SO To-chong is an alias. Other officials were SO's deputy, CHANG In-chief, aged 30, SKIP member and a native of North Kyongsang Province, and the intelligence officer, CHONG Kyu-si, aged 30, of Kangwon Province and a member of the NKIP. Lieutenant YI Tae-ho was also on the staff.

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- 16. In October 1951 the South Hamgyong Province office of the Ministry of Social Security was in a shelter half-underground at the foot of Pallyong-san (127-32, 39-56) (CV 7521). The shelter was about three and one-half nevers high, seven meters wide, and eleven meters long; it was roofed with tiles and covered with stalks and grasses. The sides of the shelter were walled with red brick and covered with grass, and from the air, although part of the red brick wall could be seen, the structure appeared to be a hear of earth such as is often piled over vegetables in Korea to keep them from freezing during the winter. Five dug-cuts used as air-raid shelters were in the cliff to the rear of the structure used as an office.
- 17. Chief of the South Hamgyong office was Senior Colonel YI Song-tisck (), aged 30, a member of the North Korean Labor Party. The head of the First Section was Lieutenent Colonel SONG Tong-pon (), aged 26, also an NKIP member. SONG had a staff of six or seven section beinbers, and his task was to organize an underground cell network and collect information through it. There were fifteen sections in all in the office, each of which had about six staff employees. The Fourth Section was the personnel section (Kanbu Kwa). Each staff employee carried a Soviet pistol and the detachment also had 10 PPSh's and 20 Mosin-Nagant rifles. There were five platoons of armsei guards directly controlled by the detachment. The strength of the detachment, not including the guards, was about 100 men.
- 18. In October 1951 the Chongo yong-gim (127-22, 39-46) (CV 6003) Public Security Detachment? was composed of 21 persons under Lieutenant Colonel YI Yong-chae (A) (A), aged 27, a member of the NKLP. The head of the Pirst Section was PAK Tong-kol (A) (A), aged 26. The Second Section was in charge of Sanior Lieutenant (H)OC (A) (fmu), aged 24; and there were reven other sections in the office. Light Leaders for each district (myon) in Chongo yong-gun were on the staff of the detachment. These leaders, the vice chief of the section, and the chiefs of the First and Second Sections were furnished Soviet pistels, while the chief had a caliber .45 pistol. A few PPSh's and Nosin-Nagant rifles were also among the arms.
- In Nevember 1950 HONG Sun-uk (英方方), aged 23, who had been a nember of the Democratic Youth Alliance, the Soviet-Korean Culture Association, and other North Korean patriotic organizations, pretended to be an ROK sympathizer and became a member and planning section chief of the anti-Communist Korean Students Corps (Tachen Hakto Holmk Tan) in Bonsan. He retreated, with refugees fleeing the Communist armies, to To-do in December 1950, and on 24 December forced a group of them at guapoint to return with him to the mainland, where he turned them over to the North Korean Chongo yong-gun security office. In Jamuary 1951 he had two teen-aged boys wranted on charges of distributing ROK propaganda leaflets. He was commended for his loyal activity, was appointed a member of the signal corps of the Security Department of the North Korean Ministry of Social Security, and in early April 1951 served on the personal signal staff of the chief of the Chongp byong-gun detachment of the MSS, Lieutenant Colonel Y. Yong-chae. In early July HUNG was placed in charge of special operations of the Diamond Mountain (Kumgang-san) Agits of the South Hangyong Province Department of the MSS. He later was ordered by his superior, YI Chong-u (p) (a)), aged 30, to infiltrate on ROK guerrilla unit operating from Poro-sum (127-19, 39-55) (CV 5619), where HONG worked more than a month. In mid-August he wan able to lead five of the guerrillas.

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KANG Se-myong, aged 40, CH'OE Kyong-hwa, CHU Ki-il, HAN Pu-hyop, aged 21, and YI Yong-su, aged 19, into the hands of the HSS, which executed them. In October he was instructed by SON Yong-pom (), h, h), chief of the First Section to use letters captured from two ROK agents, one of them a radio operator, to pose as an ROK sympathizer, and inform ROK headquarters in Pusan that the agent and the operator were still operating in the mountains, thereby inducing the headquarters to supply them with weapons and other supplies. He was also instructed to secure information on United Nations troop and weapon strength on Yo-do in Monsan harbor, and details of ROK intelligence operations. HONG took a small boat to Yo-do, where he was accrested by ROK authorities.

- 21. In early November 1951 the Kosöng-gun detachment was holding 200 suspects for investigation; half of them were charged with being from families some members of which had fled to the Ruk, or with being espionage agents for the United Nations. The others were reactionaries or those who refused to cooperate with the North Korean government. Most of the suspects had been weakened by the poor food, only 200 grams of rice, millet, and beens being furnished daily; by torture; and by the lack of ventilation in the calls. During one ten-day period in Hovember, two women and three men died of hunger and four other persons were tortured to death.

MS School at Uiju

A school for training officers of the State Security Darress which was located in September 1950 at the Chaesongwon Mine (125-45, 38-59)(YD-3818 in October 1950 was moved to Usui-myon, Pyoktong-gun (125-29, 40-42) (YF-1008), and in December to Samhapch on, a small village in the Tunghua Helen (125-57, 41-43) area of Manchuria. The school remained at Samhapch on until July 1951. when it returned to Korea and was re-established at Uiju (124-32, 40-12) (NE 3051). At Sanhapch'on the school was directed by AN Prong-in, about 50 years old, who had a stoff of 30 teachers. One was CEO In-hwen, about 28 years old, who taught intelligence. There were about 1,200 students at the school. Of these 700 attended school for only the first three months and graduated in the first group; and 500 attended an additional three months and graduated in the second group. The principal subject at the school was intelligence, 24 hours of tisses per week being devoted to its study. Other subjects included Communist Party history, nine hours per week; examination techniques, six hours; and Korean geography and history, Russian history, markmanship, and military training, two or three hours each. Eighty men of the second group received a superior rating of five points or above none failed the course.

280

The training at the school included lectures on the detection and investigation of United Nations espionage agents. The students were instructed that these agents were usually put ashore by small boat after warships had bombarded the coast or were dropped by parachute after United Mations eigeraft had strafed the area; they were therefore warned to investigate these areas carefully for agents who might have infiltrated. They were told these agents were often disguised as North Korean army troops, employees of government offices, or refugees, and that frequently they carried labor Party certificates, identification cards of government offices, fountain pens, radios. and cameras. They were instructed therefore to investigate thoroughly parsome displaying any of these documents or articles. They were taught to ask suspects the following questions: date suspect entered the Labor Party, place, guarantor, and province where he lived. These questions were to be asked again five minutes later, and the speech of the suspect compared with that of the place of issue of the identity card, and the photograph compared with the suspect's appearance. Travel certificates were to be similarly checked, but there was no definite scientific method of interrogetion indicated to the students.9

- 25X1A Comment. The North Korean State Security Bureau, originally part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was raised to ministry status in April 1951 and reorganized as the Ministry of Social Security (MSS), Saboe Anckon Sung, sometimes translated as the Public Security Ministry. It is this ministry which is the intelligence agency referred to in this report.
- 25X1A 2 Comment. The organization of the Kaesong brench of the MSS was described in
- 25X1A Comment. The other nets are presumably local security informant nets.
- 25X1A Comment. A KIM Tac-ho was arrested by ROK police twice in August 1950 for forgery of United Nations identity cards, but he escaped both times. KIM is the only person mentioned in this report on whom there is possibly applicable information in the files of this headquarters.
- 25X1A Comment. The use of the Chosun Sangsa as a cover agency for activities of the North Korean State Security Bureau from 1947 to 1950 has often been reported.
- 25X1A 6 Company. Presumably this is the same MSC detachment described in paragraphs 12 and 13. Of special interest in those paragraphs are the facts that the highest officials, with one exception, appear to be natives of South Korea, and that the First Bureau, and more especially the 17th Unit, is primarily interested in counter-intelligence and counter-espionage.
- Compant. Presumably the same unit as described in paragraph 19.
- S Commant. "Agit" is a term used by the MES to describe an installation used for the training and briefing of agents.
- 25X1A 9 Commont. The large number of students and the type of instruction given suggest this school was for officials to be used in internal security work.

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